Routledge, 2020. — 222 p. — ISBN: 1351064207, 9781351064200. — (Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Science).
Common sense philosophy holds that widely and deeply held beliefs are justified in the absence of defeaters. While this tradition has always had its philosophical detractors who have defended various forms of skepticism or have sought to develop rival epistemological views, recent advances in several scientific disciplines claim to have debunked the reliability of the faculties that produce our common sense beliefs. At the same time, however, it seems reasonable that we cannot do without common sense beliefs entirely. Arguably, science and the scientific method are built on, and continue to depend on, common sense.
This collection of essays debates the tenability of common sense in the face of recent challenges from the empirical sciences. It explores to what extent scientific considerations—rather than philosophical considerations—put pressure on common sense philosophy. The book is structured in a way that promotes dialogue between philosophers and scientists. Noah Lemos, one of the most influential contemporary advocates of the common sense tradition, begins with an overview of the nature and scope of common sense beliefs, and examines philosophical objections to common sense and its relationship to scientific beliefs. Then, the volume features essays by scientists and philosophers of science who discuss various proposed conflicts between commonsensical and scientific beliefs: the reality of space and time, about the nature of human beings, about free will and identity, about rationality, about morality, and about religious belief. Notable philosophers who embrace the common sense tradition respond to these essays to explore the connection between common sense philosophy and contemporary debates in evolutionary biology, neuroscience, physics, and psychology.
The Paradox of Science and Common Sense
Common Sense, Philosophy, and Science
How the Many Worlds Interpretation Brings Common Sense to Paradoxical Quantum Experiments
Why the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics Needs More Than Hilbert Space Structure
Common Sense and Relativistic Supercoincidence
Coincidence Problems Without Properties
Conceptual Revisions Intentions and Free Will in the Light of Cognitive Neuroscience
The Emergence of Free, Intentional Control Reply to Haselager
Psychological Challenges to Common Sense Philosophy Illusions of Introspection and Free Will
Radically Self-Deceived? Not So Fast
Common Sense Morality and Its Evolutionary Underpinnings
Evolution and Moral Common Sense. Why You Can’t Have It Both Ways; a Response to Ruse
Dual Inheritance, Common Sense, and the Justification of Religious Belief
Cultural Evolution and Debunking Arguments. A Response to Davis